William & Mary Law Review
Volume 22 (1980-1981)
Issue 2

Article 3

December 1980

Hart and Hobbes
Roger A. Shiner

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr
Part of the Law Commons

Repository Citation
Roger A. Shiner, Hart and Hobbes, 22 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 201 (1980),
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr/vol22/iss2/3
Copyright c 1980 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship
Repository.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr

HART AND HOBBES*
ROGER
I.

A. SHINER**

INTRODUCTION

The possibilities for comparison between Hobbes and Hart are
clearly legion. This paper concentrates on a topic central to the
thinking of both men, the nature of our obligation to obey the law.
I use 'obligation' here and throughout in a preanalytic sense, thus
leaving the term open as to the theoretical account to be given of
legal obligation. A great deal of what Hobbes says may be, and
traditionally by commentators has been taken to be, about political obligation. I take the latter to be a more diffuse term than legal
obligation. Legal obligation has to do with the proper stance of
men to what is in a strict sense black-letter law. Political obligation has to do with the proper stance of men to any manifestation
of the institute of the state. The distinction can be seen in this
way. Legal sovereignty-one might say, that which generates legal
obligation-has as its source in Canada the practice of the courts
together with what is enacted by the Queen in Parliament (ignoring the complication of the British North America Act).1 But the
source of 'real' political sovereignty in a modern Western democracy such as Canada is a much more complex matter, involving
questions of the influences which actually get candidates elected to
Parliament, those who control those influences, the political relevance of non-political institutions, and so forth. As Harold Laski
puts it:
For the lawyer, all that is immediately necessary is a knowledge
* Revised version of a paper presented to the Hobbes Tercentenary Conference,
University of Alberta, June 1979.
The author is grateful to Wes Cooper, Chris Morris, and Tom Pocklington for helpful
criticism.
** B.A., Cambridge University;, M.A., University of Alberta; M.A., Ph.D., Cambridge
University. Professor of Philosophy, University of Alberta.
1. The British North America Act of 1867, 30 Vict., c.3, established and constituted Canada as a separate Union from the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland. Although
the Act is British, it serves in effect as the Canadian constitution.
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of the authorities that are legally competent to deal with the
problems that arise. For him, then, the idea of sovereignty has a
particular and definite meaning ....
For political philosophy, on the other hand, legal competence
is no more than a contingent index to the facts it needs. The
political philosopher is concerned with the discovery
of motives,
2
the measure of wills, the balance of interests.
These issues tend to be conflated in Hobbes because he was writing at a time when the practical concerns about political obligation
and sovereignty were manifesting themselves in systematic failure
to obey the law. He does speak, however, about the nature of civil
law and how we should stand towards it, though these remarks are
integrated into his wider theory. Thus it is legitimate to treat him
as having a theory of legal obligation.
The topic of legal obligation interests me in its own right, and
the focus of this paper is clearly on it, rather than on the scholarly
understanding of Hobbes. Nonetheless, I hope that the points I
make will help to clarify what seems to be a matter of concern to
some commentators.
The two standard theories of legal obligation are reductive. The
first regards the term 'obligation' as a misnomer. 'Obligation,' as
both Hobbes and Hart recognise, carries connotations of doing
what one does not wish to do; as Hart puts it, by obligation conduct is made 'nonoptional.'S According to the first standard theory,
the only sound reasons for thus restricting oneself are prudential
ones. One is obliged to obey the law because the cost to oneself of
not doing so would be intolerable. Obedience to the law is required
by no more and no less than self-interest. The other traditional
theory reduces legal obligation to moral obligation. We must obey
the law because the law enshrines legitimate moral demands, and
we have an obligation to obey legitimate moral demands.
Hart defends an account of legal obligation which in his view is
not reducible to either of these. It is an account which asserts the
existence of legal obligation as a phenomenon in its own right, that
does not need to ride the coattails of morality or self-interest. His
theory has been aptly labeled by Barry Hoffmaster a "descriptive
2. H.
3. H.

LASKI, THE FOUNDATIONS OF SOVEREIGNTY AND OTHER ESSAYS
HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 6 (1961).

229-30 (1921).
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account of legal obligation."' I am inclined to think that some such
theory of legal obligation is the correct one. But that is a large
issue. Even the question of the strengths and weaknesses of Hart's
own theory involves more questions than can be discussed here.
However, the point of taking time to compare and contrast Hobbes
and Hart on legal obligation is that Hobbes' theory, although
clearly a prime candidate for the first kind of reductive theory, is a
more subtle version of that type of theory than is often realised.
Hobbes is sensitive to many of the issues which lead Hart to reject
all such prudentialist reductions of legal obligation. Thus, by investigating and understanding why, from Hart's point of view,
Hobbes' theory is still too prudentialist, I shall expose for consideration some of the reasons for adopting a 'descriptive' theory of
legal obligation. By the end of the paper, I shall show that there
are deficiencies in Hart's own statement of such a theory, although
I shall be able to do little more than lay out the broad lines of a
programme for dealing with them.
In English jurisprudence, the classical statement of a prudentialist view of legal obligation would be John Austin's "Command
Theory of Law." In section II, therefore, I shall show how Hobbes'
account of legal obligation is not so prudentialist as Austin's. In
section III, I shall consider the ways in which Hart's theory is similar to Hobbes'. Section IV will turn to the more argumentative
issue of the ways in which Hart is different from Hobbes. I shall
show that, when all is said and done, the constraints which Hart
places on an adequate theory of legal obligation cannot ever be satisfied by a Hobbesian theory. I shall implicitly defend the claim
that Hart's constraints are legitimate. In section V, I shall turn to
Michael Payne's fundamental criticisms of Hart's theory of legal
obligation. Payne argues that Hart's account of the authority of
the law and legal obligation is deeply inconsistent and that Hart
does not have the resources in his theory to distinguish it from a
basically Hobbesian assimilation of authority to power. I shall argue that this criticism is mistaken, but that it can only be seen to
be so by providing Hart's theory with a metaphysical grounding
that he has neither supplied nor seen the need for.
4. Hoffmaster, Professor Hart on Legal Obligation, 11 GA. L. REv. 1303, 1324 (1977).
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AND AUSTIN

The broad outlines of Austin's theory will be familiar. I offer no
surprises. Law or rules properly so called are a species of command.5 A command is distinguished from other significations of
desire by the power and purpose of the party commanding to inflict an evil or pain in case the desire be disregarded.6 Being liable
to evil if one does not comply with the command, one is bound or
obliged by it.7 Laws proceed from superiors and bind inferiors.,
Superiority signifies might, the power of affecting others with evil
or pain.9 Every positive law, or every law strictly so called, is a
direct or circuitous command of a monarch or sovereign number to
a person or persons in a state of subjection to its author. 10 The
superiority which is styled sovereignty and the independent society
which sovereignty implies are distinguished from other superiority
by the following marks or characters: (1) the bulk of the given society are in a habit of obedience or submission to a determinate and
common superior; (2) that certain individual or body of individuals
is not in a habit of obedience to a determinate human superior. 1
Hart adduces the case of a gunman threatening one with being
shot if one does not hand over one's money and refers to the Austinian theory as finding legal obligation in the gunman situation
writ large. 2
Austin's version of the command theory has an appealing,
though in Hart's view meretricious, simplicity. Hobbes' account of
legal obligation is not so simple. Let me begin with the Austinian
elements. Hobbes offers both an informal and a formal definition
of civil law, and each seems to anticipate Austin:
[A]s men for the attaining of peace, and conservation of themselves thereby, have made an artificial man, which we call a
commonwealth; so also have they made artificial chains, called
civil laws, which they themselves, by mutual covenants, have
5. J. AUSTIN, THE

PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED

6. Id. at 14.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 24.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 134.
11. Id. at 193-94.
12. H. HART, supra note 3, at 80.

13 (H. Hart ed. 1965).
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fastened at one end, to the lips of that man, or assembly, to
whom they have given the sovereign power; and at the other end
to their own ears.13
Less fancifully he states:
CIVm LAW, is to every subject, those rules, which the common-

wealth hath commanded him, by word, writing, or other sufficient sign of the will, to make use of, for the distinctionof right
and wrong; that is to1 say, of what is contrary, and what is not
contrary to the rule. 4
Hobbes also espouses the Positivistic separation of law and morality. Austin's famous dictum is that "the existence of law is one
' Hobbes writes:
thing; its merit or demerit, another."15
[T]he laws of nature, which consist in equity, justice, gratitude,
and other moral virtues on these depending,... are not properly laws, but qualities that dispose men to peace and obedience.
When a commonwealth is once settled, then they are actually
laws, and not before; as being then the commands of the commonwealth; and therefore also civil laws."6
Similar sentiments are expressed later in the work. 17
What chiefly evokes the comparison of Hobbes to Austin is the
emphasis on fear and punishment in connexion with behaviour according to the law. The bonds by which men are bound and
obliged "have their strength, not from their own nature, for nothing is more easily broken than a man's word, but from fear of some
evil consequence upon the rupture."1 8 The force of words is too
weak to hold men to their covenant; fear of the consequence is the
greater power in enabling them to keep it. 19 Chapter XVII, "Of the
Causes, Generation and Definition of a Commonwealth," begins
with a characterization of "that miserable condition of war" in
terms of there being "no visible power. . . to tie [men] by fear of
13. T. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN OR THE MATrER, FORME AND POWER OF A COMMONWEALTH
ECCLESIASTICALL AND CWvM 138 (M. Oakeshott ed. 1949).
14. Id. at 173.
15. J. AUSTIN, supra note 5, at 184.
16. T. HOBBES, supra note 13, at 174.

17. See id. at 180.
18. Id. at 86.
19. Id. at 92.
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punishment to the performance of their covenants, the observation
of [the] laws of nature."2 "[C]ovenants, being but words and
breath, have no force to oblige, contain, constrain, or protect any
man, but what it has from the public sword."21 Civil laws, "in their
own nature but weak, may nevertheless be made to hold by the
danger, though not by the difficulty of breaking them. '22 Men do
not know that "the laws are of no power to protect them, without a
sword in the hands of a man, or men, to cause those laws to be put
into execution."2 3 Finally, with coruscating wit, he asserts, "For
such [sovereign] authority is to trump in Card-playing, save that in
matter of Government, when nothing else is turn'd up, Clubs are
24
Trump."
Such sentiments as these lead Peters to assert baldly that, for
Hobbes, fear of punishment is the cause of political obedience.2 5
Plamenatz takes a similar line.26 But it is not that simple. Gauthier
wisely reminds us that there is a crucial distinction between the
question of what might lead men in the first place to make the
covenant setting up the sovereign and the question of what might
make men keep their covenants in the established commonwealth.27 One cannot be sure that the passages in Hobbes address
the second question exclusively. Yet it is exclusively in the second
context that Austin refers to the visiting of evil on those who do
not comply, and his views of laws as commands of a sovereign
backed by threats presuppose an existing state. In fact, Raphael is
28
right when he says that Hobbes rejects the "gunman" analogy,
although, in order to see why, a fuller story must be told than
Raphael provides.
I shall begin that story by mentioning a commentator who tries
but fails to make the relevant point. Barry rightly criticises

Id. at 109.
Id. at 115.
Id. at 138.
Id. at 139.
T. HOBBES, A DIALOGUE BETWEEN A PHILOSOPHER & A STUDENT OF THE COMMON LAWS
OF ENGLAND 140 (J. Cropsey ed. 1971).
25. R. PETERS, HOBES 194 (1956).
26. Plamenatz, Mr. Warrender's Hobbes, in HOBBES STUDIES 77 (K. Brown ed. 1965).
27. D. GAUTHIER, THE LOGIC OF LEVIATHAN 60, 77 (1969).
28. D. RAPHAEL, HOBBES 39 (1977).
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
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Plamenatz for assimilating Hobbes to Austin, 29 and later, borrowing Hart's distinction between 'being obliged' and 'being under an
obligation,'"0 Barry says that, whereas Austin makes legal obligation a case of the former, Hobbes makes it a case of the latter. As
we shall see, this contains a good measure of truth. Barry's articulation of the point, however, fails to bring it out.
Barry claims that, for Hobbes, our obligation to obey the law is a
special case of our obligation to keep our word.3 1 By constraining
others, rather than ourselves, the sovereign reduces for us the evils
to which we are liable by giving our word.32 One is obliged to obey
the law just in case certain nullifying conditions are absent.33 This
will not do. Hobbes certainly recognises that one who makes covenants in the state of nature "exposeth himself to the perverse will"
of the others.3 4 Trust that another will reciprocate is foolish gullibility. 5 But if the only role of the sovereign is to reduce the odds
of getting hurt by making covenants, what sense is to be made of
the whole notion of the right of nature being transferred over to
the sovereign? Certainly, the transference of right is conditional
upon the sovereign delivering the goods in terms of security and
freedom from war. As long as the sovereign does that, there is no
question of a prudential calculation as to whether on this occasion
to keep a contract. The Legal Realist's bad man calculates whether
he will get caught when he considers whether to obey the law.36
Barry's Hobbesian calculates whether others will get caught when
they disobey the law. Such calculation is to consider, in effect, on
each and every occasion whether to assign to the sovereign the
right to act on one's own behalf. Hobbes, however, quite clearly
intends that, once the commonwealth is agreed on and set up,
there is no question of repeatedly reopening negotiations. This is
implied in Leviathan:
[WIhen a man hath in either manner [by renouncing or transfer29. Barry, Warrender and his Critics, 43 PHi.osoPmY 121 (1968).
30. H. HART, supra note 3, at 80.
31. Barry, supra note 29, at 124.
32. Id. at 125-26.
33. Id. at 127.
34. T. HOBBES, DE CrvE OR THE CITIZEN 36 (S. Lamprecht ed. 1949).
35. See T. HOBBES, supra note 13, at 89.
36. See H. HART, supra note 3, at 39, 81-83.
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ring] abandoned or granted away his right; then he is said to be
OBLIGED,

or

BOUND,

not to hinder those, to whom such right is

37
granted, or abandoned, from the benefit of it.

Elsewhere he explicitly states, "He that Transferreth his power,
hath deprived himself of it." 38
The key to understanding this aspect of Hobbes is in the word
'formerly' in the statement that law is the command "only of him,
whose command is addressed to one formerly obliged to obey
him."" That is, we have taken on the obligation to keep the law, to
abide by our covenant, at the time that we agreed to set up the
sovereign. This obligation is certainly in some sense prudential.
Life in the state of nature is an exceedingly tiresome business.
"[T]he motive, and end for which this renouncing, and transferring
of right is introduced, is nothing else but the security of a man's
person, in his life, and in the means of so preserving life, as not to
''4° Performance of covenant is a dictate of a law of
be weary of it.
4
nature, namely, the third law of nature.4 2 Without the performance of covenant, we would be back in the state of nature. "[A]
civil law, that shall forbid rebellion, (and such is all resistance to
the essential rights of the sovereignty), is not, as a civil law, any
obligation, but by virtue only of the law of nature, that forbiddeth
the violation of faith. ' ' 43 Men may join together in the state of nature for a while; but, without a sovereign, "they must needs by the
difference of their interests dissolve, and fall again into a war
' 44
among themselves."
45
It should now be clear that the fear referred to by Hobbes,
which provides the motivation to obey the law, is not the fear of
immediate punishment by the sovereign (fine, jail, hanging, etc.).
Rather, it is the fear of a return to the state of nature, and all the
misery that such a return involves, if by rebellion (in Hobbes' tech-

37. T. HOBBES, supra note
38. T. HOBBES, supra note
39. T. HOBBES, supra note
40. Id. at 87.
41. Id. at 174.
42. Id. at 93.
43. Id. at 220.
44. Id. at 110-11.
45. See text accompanying

13, at 86.
24, at 89.
13, at 172.

notes 18-20 supra.
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nical sense) the power of the sovereign is undermined. Hobbes remarks explicitly that in the case of sovereignty by acquisition there
is fear of the sovereign; but in the case of sovereignty by institution, it is fear of one another that makes men keep their covenant. 6 Immediately after, Hobbes says that, once a commonwealth
is instituted, fear of death constitutes a different kind of obligation from that constituted by a promise to keep the covenant.
These are very different sentiments from the Austinian command
theory, and their prudential-seeming character should not blind us
to this.
Of course, a Hobbesian sovereign will visit with evil one who
breaks the law; as well as law-abiding men in a Hobbesian commonwealth, there will be those who always do calculate whether
the game is worth the candle, and for them a Hobbesian sovereign
will function as a negative utility. We can account very well for
this in Hobbesian theory, however, without having it forced upon
us as an account of legal obligation in Hobbes tout court. The commonwealth is an artificial creation, we are repeatedly told. Raphael
likens it to a clockwork train.4 The setting up of the commonwealth is likened to the initial winding up of the train and setting
it on the tracks, but the clockwork mechanism will run down and
need to be rewound. So also the commonwealth has in it forces at
work which will cause it to "run down." These are the natural passions of men, which are contrary to the laws of nature.48 If Hobbes
were an Austinian, then mere punishment of wrongdoers would be
sufficient to keep the commonwealth going. Since he is not, there
must therefore be some other force which supplies the basic momentum, a force to which the natural passions are opposed. That
cannot be merely the fear of immediate punishment. It must be
some deeper and more far-reaching natural commitment to the
sustaining of the commonwealth, and that is exactly what Hobbes
provides, in terms of fear of a return to the state of nature.
Raphael's "clockwork train" analogy is inadequate to represent
Hobbes' view of the state and its legal system. The clockwork train
has only two forces at work, gravitational inertia and the force pro46. T. HOBBES, supra note 13, at 129-30.
47. D. RAPHAEL, supra note 28, at 30.
48. T. HOBBES, supra note 13, at 109.
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vided by the coiled spring. The winding up is by a force external to
the mechanical system. In the Hobbesian commonwealth, however,
the three basic natural forces-the law of nature to keep covenants, those natural passions which incline men to break covenants, and the fear of a return to the state of nature to counteract
those natural passions-are internal. All this makes Hobbes' theory of legal obligation not reducible to the commands of a sovereign backed by threats.
III.

HOBBES AND HART: SIMILARITIES

I merely mentioned Hart in section II as another opponent of
Austin's command theory of law. I shall not make a separate statement of Hart's view on law and legal obligation. The structure of
his theory will emerge along the way in my statement of his similarities to Hobbes in this section and my statement of the crucial
differences between him and Hobbes in the next section.
The similarities between Hobbes and Hart, apart from their
shared Positivistic inclination to separate law and morality, may
be considered under two heads: the role of coercion in Hart's analysis of legal obligation, and his celebrated doctrine of the minimum content of natural law. The Concept of Law makes it quite
clear that for Hart law is, in part, essentially coercive.4 9 Although
he rejects the 'gunman' view of law, he still articulates the obligatoriness of law partly in terms of the ideas that law makes conduct nonoptional and that physical sanctions are prominent among
the kinds of social pressure that go to creating legal obligation.
"[T]he insistence on importance or seriousness of social pressure
behind the rules is the primary factor determining whether they
are thought of as giving rise to obligations," 50 be these legal or
moral rules. Later on, he writes:
'Sanctions' are therefore required not as the normal motive for
obedience, but as a guaranteethat those who would voluntarily
obey shall not be sacrificed to those who would not. To obey,
without this, would be to risk going to the wall. Given this
standing danger, what reason demands is voluntary cooperation

49. H. HART, supra note 3, at 80-88.
50. Id. at 84.
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in a coercive system.5 1

Even though Hobbes talks more explicitly of fear, he does insist
that fear and liberty are consistent and that action out of fear is
still voluntary action. 52 So he attempts likewise to combine elements of free choice and coercion in his account of legal obligation.
We shall be returning to Hart's emphasis on coercion in section V
in considering Payne's claim that Hart has not escaped the tentacles of the Hobbesian deification of power.
Hart's doctrine of the minimum content of natural law can be
compared with Hobbes' theory by the examination of three aspects: its content, its role, and what I shall call its metaphysical
depth. Hart begins Chapter IX of The Concept of Law by reminding us of the teleological way of viewing human life. Mentioning Hobbes, he expresses the thought that survival is a basic aim of
human life.53 He continues:
From this point the argument is a simple one. Reflection on
some very obvious generalisations-indeed truisms-concerning
human nature and the world in which men live, shows that as
long as these hold good, there are certain rules of conduct which
any social organisation must contain if it is to be viable."
These truths constitute the minimum content of natural law. They
afford a reason why, given survival as an aim, law and morals
should include a specific content.5 5 The truisms are human vulnerability and approximate equality, limited altruism, limited resources, and limited understanding and strength of will. These will
produce respectively prohibitions restricting the use of violence in
killing or inflicting bodily harm, a system of mutual forbearance
and compromise which is the base of both legal and moral obligation, 6 some minimal form of the institution of property and rules
to enable individuals to create obligations and to vary their incidence, and a system of organised sanctions to coerce malefactors.
It is a commonplace that the Hobbesian sovereign is there to
51. Id. at 193.
52. T. HOBBES, supra note 13, at 137.
53. H. HART, supra note 3, at 187.

54. Id. at 188.
55. Id. at 189.
56. Id. at 189-95.
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restrict physical violence. He is also there to ensure forbearance
and some acceptance of reciprocity of claim; he functions in terms
of the Golden Rule.57 He is charged with the maintenance of property and mercantile transactions in a regular way.5 8 He coerces the
recalcitrant. In terms of content, therefore, both Hobbes and Hart
have similar opinions about the core of a legal system.
The role of this minimum content doctrine in Hart is in some
ways similar to that of Hobbes' unlimited sovereign: to underpin
an account of legal obligation without simply reducing it to moral
obligation. It is also noticeable that both Hobbes and Hart deny
that it is simply a fact that these truisms are so. Hobbes makes
constant references to laws of nature, to reason and right reason.
Hart speaks of "natural necessity," and says:
[I]t is a truth of some importance that for the adequate description not only of law but of many other social institutions, a place
must be reserved, besides definitions and ordinary statements of
fact, for a third category of statements: those the truth of which
is contingent in human beings and the world they live in retaining the salient characteristics which they have. 9
It is true that Hobbes does want to emphasise the need for precise
definitions in the writing of civil philosophy, and reason for him
has much more to do with definitional truth than it does for Hart.
But the common idea I want to emphasise is that the nature of
man is not a mere fact like the colour of the shirt one wears.
IV. HOBBES AND HART:

DIFFERENCES

The previous section has pointed out that both Hobbes and Hart
think of law as in part a coercive system, and that for both this has
to do with survival as the aim of human society and the role of law
in such society. Nonetheless, this section will show that there are
fundamental differences between the Hobbesian and the Hartian
views of legal obligation. The foundation of legal obligation for
Hobbes is still ultimately free choice based on self-interest,
whereas no such thorough individualism can be found in Hart. We
57. T. HOBBEs, supra note 13, at 103.
58. Id. at 161.
59. H. HART, supra note 3, at 195.
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must again be reminded that neither man regards legal obligation
as collapsed into moral obligation in the sense in which the latter
term would be systematically distinguished from obligations of
prudence or self-interest. We shall see how Hobbes fails in the end
to find a middle road between the two standard reductive analyses
of legal obligation and how, if we accept his account at face value,
Hart does so succeed. In this way we will better understand the
significance of offering a descriptive theory of legal obligation and
the issues which such a theory illuminates.
We have seen already that, for Hobbes, the obligation to obey
the law is grounded in the covenant that Hobbesian men make
with themselves to set up a sovereign. That obligation is self-imposed, even though it is underwritten by self-interest. "[N]o man is
obliged by a covenant, whereof he is not author," 60 "there being no
obligation on any man which ariseth not from some act of his
own."'61 It is essential to the creation of legal obligation in Hobbes
that those obliged have certain beliefs about what will happen if no
covenant is agreed upon and have certain motives for agreeing to
the covenant. Hart associates such beliefs and motives with 'being
obliged' rather than 'being under an obligation.'6 2 It is essential to

legal obligation, for Hobbes, that there is some kind of felt pressure to obey the law, even though, as I have argued, this is not the
felt pressure of the gunman situation.
As Wolin has properly emphasised, 3 and as Macpherson has
stressed in his notion of 'possessive individualism,'6 the purpose of
the covenant and the sovereign is not to overcome particularity but
to guarantee it. As Wolin says, Hobbes' concern with the individ60. T. HOBBES, supra note 13, at 106.

61. Id. at 141. Compare an earlier statement of this self-imposed obligation:
But if he that so covenanteth, knew beforehand he was to expect no other
assurance, than the actor's word; then is the covenant valid; because the actor
in this case maketh himself the author. And therefore, as when the authority is
evident, the covenant obligeth the author, not the actor; so when the authority
is feigned, it obligeth the actor only, there being no author but himself.
Id. at 106.
62. H. HART, supra note 3, at 80.
63. S. WOLIN, POLITICS AND VISION, CONTINUITY AND INNOVATION IN WESTERN POLITICAL
THOUGHT 274-75 (1960).
64. See C. MAcPHERsON,
LocKE (1962).

THE PoLrIcAL THEORY OF POSSESSIVE

INDvIDUALIsM-HoBES TO
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ual's natural desires is not that these desires are evil or that they
need the discipline of reason; it is merely that they are self-defeating. Free indulgence of them produces a state of war, and thus
misery, not happiness. Hobbes' emphasis on society as an automaton, an artificial machine, is deliberately intended to contradict the
mediaeval image of society as a body, an organic whole.6 5 Hobbes
does say that society after the covenant is "more than consent, or
concord; it is a real unity of them all .... The multitude so

united in one person is called a COMMONWEALTH." 6' 6 The unity is
that of a smoothly functioning mechanical system, however, and
the repressive force of the sovereign is a necessary part of its frictionless functioning. The mental stance towards the laws of the
commonwealth is in the end conscious acceptance of them as rational in terms of natural self-interest.
The Hartian picture is very different. Hart's point of departure
is rejection of the Austinian theory of law, on the grounds that
"the elements out of which the theory was constructed, viz. the
idea of orders, obedience, habits and threats, do not include, and
cannot by their combination yield, the idea of a rule, without
which we cannot hope to elucidate even the most elementary forms
of law."' 67 For Hart, 'rule' is the central concept for understanding

legal obligation. He distinguishes between two different types of
rule in a legal system. Primary rules are rules under which human
beings are required to do or abstain from certain actions, whether
they wish to or not; these rules impose duties. Secondary rules provide that human beings may be doing or saying certain things that
introduce new rules of the primary type, extinguish or modify old
ones, or in various ways determine their incidence or control their
operations: secondary rules confer powers, public or private; they
provide for operations which lead to the creation or variation of
duties or obligations.68 "[1]n the combination of these two types of
rules there lies what Austin wrongly claimed to have found in the
notion of coercive orders, namely, 'the key to the science of
jurisprudence.' '"9
65.
66.
67.
68.

Compare T. HOBBES, supra note 13, at 5, with S.
T. HOBBES, supra note 13, at 112.
H. HAT, supra note 3, at 78.
Id. at 78-79.

69. Id. at 79.

WOLIN,

supra note 63, at 275.
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What precisely does Hart mean by a 'rule'? Rules are to be distinguished from habits.70 In both cases there will be a convergent
pattern of behaviour, but social rules have three salient points of
difference from habits. First, in the case of rules but not habits,
deviations are generally regarded as lapses or faults open to criticism, and threatened deviations meet with pressure for conformity.
Second, in the case of rules but not habits, deviation from the
standard is generally accepted as a good reason for criticism.
Third, and perhaps most important, rules have and habits do not
have what Hart calls "an internal aspect.

'7 1

Persons subject to

rules must have the internal point of view towards them. Some at
least must look upon the behaviour enjoined by the rule as a general standard to be followed by the group as a whole. The internal
point of view is manifested in a critical reflective attitude towards
the behaviour enjoined by the rule. This critical reflective attitude
to certain patterns of behaviour as a common standard should display itself in criticism, including self-criticism, in demands for conformity, and in acknowledgements that such criticism and demands are justified. The heart of a legal system is the structure
which has resulted in the combination of primary rules of obligation with the secondary rules of recognition, change, and adjudication.7 2 The complex social situation in which a fundamental secondary rule of recognition is accepted and used for the identification
of primary rules of obligation is the situation "which deserves,
if
' 7' 3
anything does, to be called the foundations of a legal system.
The existence and nature of legal obligation follows directly from
the idea that a legal system is a system of social rules. The characteristic use of the vocabulary of 'obligation' presupposes the existence of a rule supplying a standard of behaviour which is generally accepted and draws attention to the fact that the situation in
which one finds oneself is covered by the rule. 4 But that is not
enough for obligation. "Rules are conceived and spoken of as imposing obligations when the general demand for conformity is insistent and the social pressure brought to bear on those who devi70.
71.
72.
73.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

54.
55.
95.
97.

74. Id. at 83.
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ate or threaten to deviate is great. ' 75 The distinctive feature of
legal obligation is that the rules in question are those which are
identified as valid rules of the legal system according to the fundamental rule of recognition which will exist, however complex, however unwritten, in any society with a legal system.
We must be clear about how Hart is using the notion of a 'rule.'
He criticises Austin for leaving it out of his theory, but in one
sense this is odd. Austin at the very beginning of The Province of
JurisprudenceDetermined says: "A law, in the most general and
comprehensive acceptation in which the term, in its literal meaning, is employed, may be said to be a rule laid down for the guidance of an intelligent being by an intelligent being having power
'
over him,"76
and he after that frequently writes "law or rule"
rather than just "law." So Hart's point has to be that Austin has
not employed the proper concept of rule or has not employed it in
the proper way. Similar things may be said about Hobbes. As Wolin has emphasised, Hobbes insists that laws are rules.77 But the
work that the notion of a rule is doing in Hobbes is quite different.
Hobbes says that laws are rules, so that men will want to look for
precision and clarity in their statement. These notions have a farreaching importance in Hobbes in relation to the way the sovereign
is to exercise legal (in a narrow sense) power. Hobbes is the champion of statute over common law. Statutes are laid down by the
sovereign in words; these words must be as precise as possible. Being merely words, however, they will be subject to ambiguity. The
ambiguity is to be resolved in terms of the intent of the sovereign.
Thus the sovereign's role in the exercise of legal power is complete.
However, there is a standing presumption that the sovereign will
intend the equitable thing. Thus the complete legal power of the
sovereign, is, for Hobbes, the way to ensure the equitable decision
in the courts. 7 8 For Hobbes, then, the insistence that laws are rules
is an important part of the justification for the sovereign's legal
power.
For Hart, the point of making the notion of a rule fundamental

75. Id. at 84.
76. J. AuSTIN, supra note 5, at 10.
77. S. WOLIN, supra note 63, at 253.

78. See T. HOBBES, supra note 13, at ch. xxvi.
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is also, partly, to clarify legal obligation and to make clear in what
sense legal obligations are voluntarily assumed, and in what sense
they are not voluntarily assumed, to make clear in what the authority of the law consists. But the insistence that laws are rules
and therefore must be the objects of the internal point of view
takes us right away from Hobbesian convenants and sovereigns.
Hart explicitly links the authority of the law to acceptance of the
law as a system of social rules.79 This may sound like "no man is
obliged by a covenant whereof he is not author," but it is not. Consider this passage:
[O]bligations created in those derivative ways under enacted
rules owe their status as obligations ultimately to the underlying
practice of the social group in accepting the legislative enactments as constituting standards of behaviour and can be understood only if we understand the simple fundamental case of the
creation of obligation by direct enactment and its dependence
on the complex social practice that constitutes this basic
authorityY'
It is not a covenant, but a complex social practicethat is, for Hart,
the ground of legal obligation. Though he emphasises voluntary cooperation in a coercive system as essential to legal authority, the
voluntariness here needs careful explication. It is not the voluntariness of a conscious and deliberate individual decision, but something more subtle.
In Are There any NaturalRights?, Hart talks of the mutual restriction involved in a legal system and says that this is not deliberately incurred, although it does arise out of a person's previous
voluntary acts."" Later in The Concept of Law, this idea is developed more fully in the doctrine of laws as social rules and in the
doctrine of the legal system as depending on an ultimate rule of
recognition. What occurs in Hobbes by covenant, occurs in Hart as
an essential element in an evolved complex legal system. The existence of a rule is a matter of the existence of a social practice of a
certain kind. Such a social practice embodies the internal point of
79. H. HART, supra note 3, at 133.
80. Hart, Legal and Moral Obligation,in EssAYs IN MoRAL PHmosoPHY 93 (A. Melvin ed.
1958).
81. Hart, Are There any Natural Rights?, 64 PHmosoPmcALR
Rv. 175-91 (1955).
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view, that is, internal acceptance of the fact that the rule intrinsically embodies a standard of behaviour. In the case of legal rules,
internal acceptance is to be construed as acceptance of the validity
of a certain procedure for enacting laws that impose legal obligations. Behaviour that is rule-governed, rather than merely habitual, is behaviour such that those who practice it do so because they
accept that it conforms to a standard, embodied in the rule, which
places requirements of conformity upon them.
Why is this to be called a "descriptive" theory of legal obligation? It does not say that people obey the law out of fear of punishment. It does not say that people obey the law out of fear of a
return to the state of nature. It does not say that people obey the
law because the law contains moral obligations. It says that people
obey the law because that is what law is-something that people
obey. Laws are social rules. Their existence as valid laws in a society is dependent upon an ultimate rule of recognition. The existence and content of such a rule in any given society are matters of
fact about that society. Legal obligations follow from this rule of
recognition. The existence and content of legal obligations is therefore a matter of fact. Statements asserting that someone is under a
legal obligation are simply statements that his case falls under a
valid legal rule. Statements of legal obligation are thus ultimately
simply statements descriptive of what is so in a certain society.
Hence the name "descriptive theory of legal obligation."
V.

TOWARDS A DESCRIPTIVE THEORY OF LEGAL OBLIGATION

It likely seems that, so stated, a descriptive theory of legal obligation is a monumental triviality. We have an obligation to obey
the law because law is the kind of thing people have an obligation
to obey; where there is law, therefore, there is legal obligation.
Who has ever thought to deny that? Certainly not Hobbes, or Austin, or Aquinas. It all depends on what you mean by 'law' and by
'obligation,' and Hart has not, it may be said, really shown that the
understanding of those terms possessed by his opponents is indeed
defective. I think, however, that his approach will stand up, although one will have to go beyond The Concept of Law or anything else he has written to bring this out.
I shall proceed towards a developed descriptive theory of legal
obligation and preserve the connexion with Hobbes by considering
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some criticisms of Hart by Michael Payne. Payne's criticisms are
important and point up some genuine difficulties in Hart's theory
as he presented it. Barry Hoffmaster also has raised some important difficulties in Hart's account of legal obligation. I shall not be
able to solve in detail all of those problems in the balance of this
paper. I shall discuss Payne's criticisms here, and Hoffmaster's
elsewhere.8 2 But it is worth mentioning the gist of Hoffmaster's
criticisms, as they suggest that Hart really is getting between the
two standard reductive accounts. I have already said that, according to Payne, Hart, by his emphasis on laws as social rules, has
simply reintroduced by the back door the Hobbesian tradition of
authority as being simply power to elicit obedience. Hoffmaster, by
contrast, says that by his emphasis on laws as social rules, Hart has
deprived himself of a way of denying legal obligation to be reducible to moral obligation. 83 So Payne takes Hart's theory to be fundamentally Hobbesian and prudentialist, while Hoffmaster thinks
it is fundamentally moralist. This suggests that Hart might well
have succeeded in his quest to preserve the best of the traditional
theories, but, since both Payne's and Hoffmaster's criticisms are
carefully documented and constructed, it also suggests that he has
not succeeded in demonstrating how this goal is attained.
Payne concentrates on what I agree is an extremely mysterious
passage in Chapter VI of The Concept of Law, in which Hart offers
what he describes as "two minimum conditions necessary and sufficient for the existence of a legal system."8 4 Since the passage is
crucial, I shall quote it in full:
There are therefore two minimum conditions necessary and sufficient for the existence of a legal system. On the one hand those
rules of behaviour which are valid according to the system's ultimate criteria of validity must be generally obeyed, and, on the
other hand, its rules of recognition specifying the criteria of legal
validity and its rules of change and adjudication must be effectively accepted as common public standards of official behaviour
by its officials. The first condition is the only one which private
82. Shiner, Towards a Descriptive Theory of Legal Obligation, in [1979] PROCEEDINGS OF
THE WORLD CONGRESS OF THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY (in publication).

83. Hoffmaster, supra note 4, at 1324.
84. H. HART, supra note 3, at 113.
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citizens need satisfy: they may obey each 'for his part only' and
from any motive whatever; though in a healthy society they will
in fact often accept these rules as common standards of behaviour and acknowledge an obligation to obey them, or even trace
this obligation to a more general obligation to respect the constitution. The second condition must also be satisfied by the officials of the system. They must regard these as common standards of official behaviour and appraise critically their own and
each other's deviations as lapses. Of course it is also true that
besides these there will be many primary rules which apply to
officials in their merely personal capacity which they need only
obey.
The assertion that a legal system exists is therefore a Janusfaced statement looking both towards obedience by ordinary citizens and to the acceptance by officials of secondary rules as
critical common standards of behaviour. 85
In order to set up Payne's criticism, we must be reminded that
'accept' for Hart is definitionally connected with the exercise of the
internal point of view, and thus with 'rule.' Moreover, early in The
Concept of Law he has associated 'obedience' definitionally with
the type of coercion occurring in the gunman situation, and therefore with an Austinian view of legal obligation rather than his
own. 6 Hart explicitly says that law based on acceptance of social
rule is a third alternative to law based on power and law based on
moral obligation. 7 But, if the above passage is taken literally, is
his position maintained consistently? Payne's argument is that it is
not. I shall present only his conclusions rather than the detailed
discussion which precedes them, since, as far as they go, I do not
wish to dispute them.
Payne states the fundamental difficulty thus:
The great limitation of the notion of acceptance of a social rule
is that although it is necessary for the existence of a rule of obligation, it is not sufficient. No amount of acceptance alone of the
secondary rules by the legal officials will yield a rule that imposes an obligation, legal or otherwise. The two minimum conditions do not imply the existence of a system that has primary

85. Id.

86. Id. at 19-20.
87. Id. at 198.
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rules of legal obligation. By itself, then, the notion of acceptance does not enable Hart to distinguish between a legal system
based on power and a legal system based on authority. Hence, if
Hart is to break cleanly with the Hobbesian tradition, the notion of acceptance of a social rule must be supplemented by another concept of social rule that squares with our concepts of
obligation and authority.18
He goes on to say that what is needed is the concept of a normative rule and that, although Hart brings this out, he cannot do so
in a way consistent with his basic position. The key claim is the
sentence that is italicised. That this sentence is correct can be
shown briefly (though it is shown by Payne in greater detail) by
considering the long quote from Hart. 9 He says there that the primary rules of obligation need only be "obeyed" by both citizens
and officials. 'Obey,' as I have noted, is the codeword for one's conformity to a gunman-type coercive order. Thus no one accepts the
primary rules of obligation from the internal point of view. Thus
no one regards the primary rules as in the appropriate sense authoritative. Therefore observance of the primary rules can only
come about by the exercise of power, and here we have a Hobbesian Hart.
I think that there is in fact a way out of this objection, although
it will involve going beyond Hart in two ways. First, it will involve
giving much more attention than Hart does to considering from
the point of view of philosophy of mind exactly what is meant by
the internal point of view. Hart's ideas about this are very muddled. I shall show this, but I shall only be very programmatic about
the remedy. Second, one must do more to relate this part of Hart's
theory to the later remarks about the minimum content of natural
law. Hart himself says comparatively little about the link in a selfconscious way. More must be said, and that 'more' must be related
to a wider metaphysical background.
The way out is referred to by Payne, although he thinks it will
not work. Hart, as Payne notes, 0 speaks towards the end of The

88. Payne, Hart's Concept of a Legal System, 18 WM. & MARY L. REv. 317-18 (1976)
(emphasis added).
89. See text accompanying note 85 supra.
90. Payne, supra note 88, at 310.
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Concept of Law of obligation resulting from a rule of recognition

as being "found in advanced social systems whose members not
merely come to accept separate rules piecemeal, but are committed
to the acceptance in advance of general classes of rule, marked out
by general criteria of validity." 1 It might seem as though there is a
sufficient sense of 'acceptance' applicable to citizens' attitude towards the primary rules if the validity of the primary rules depends on a secondary rule of recognition and the citizens accept
that. Payne's objection to this move is essentially that it can only
be explicated in Hobbesian terms: the citizens are obliged because
they are committed in advance by their acceptance of the rule of
recognition to letting the state push them around.9 2 This commitment in advance fails to produce authority rather than power. This
conclusion does not follow, however, although Hart does not make
the point easy to see.
On the one hand, Hart says: "For the most part the existence of
the rule of recognition is not stated, but its existence is shown in
the way in which particular rules are identified, either by courts or
other officials or private persons or their advisers."93 On the other
hand, he says later that it is a "fiction" to suppose that in a complex modern state the bulk of society generally share, accept, or
regard as binding the ultimate rule of recognition. "[T]he reality of
the situation is that a great proportion of ordinary citizens-perhaps a majority-have no general conception of the legal
structure or of its criteria of validity."9 ' The root problem is that
Hart simply does not sort out in detail the criteria in terms of
mental attitudes which distinguish obedience, acquiescence, and
acceptance. Nor does he distinguish clearly between those mental
criteria which are logically dispositions and those which are logically occurrences, although in either case one knows them to exist
from observing human behaviour.
The term 'acquiescence' is a palmary case. He writes, "The ordinary citizen manifests his acceptance largely by acquiescence in
the results of these official operations, ' ' "athus linking acquiescence
91. H. HART, supra note 3, at 229.
92. Payne, supra note 88, at 315.
93. H. HART, supra note 3, at 98.

94. Id. at 111.
95. Id. at 60.
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and acceptance. Yet, later he talks about the ordinary individual
acquiescing in the rules by obeying them for his part only. 6 Here,
acquiescence is distinguished from the internal point of view and
from acceptance and is associated with mere obedience. He often
talks of acceptance as active and obedience as passive. Yet he lists
an enormous number of things a citizen can do by obeying, rather
than by accepting from the internal
point of view, and most of
97
active.
quite
volitionally
are
these
Hart also talks about ordinary citizens using the law in many
ways which do not find expression in formal legal proceedings. Yet
he does not make clear whether this "using" counts as acceptance
or acquiescence or obedience or what. When acceptance is associated closely with the critical reflective attitude, it is associated
with behaviour that occurs on specific occasions, and so also when
it is associated with explicit acts of officials in legislatures and
courts of law. Yet, law is here like love. I can properly say, "Jane
Doe loves Richard Doe," and also that Dick and Jane accept that
they are under an obligation to obey the law, even though Dick
and Jane are not at the time I speak exhibiting any of the usual
behavioural manifestations of these states of mind.
There are many things here which need sorting out. But I must
resume the main argument. I shall stipulate that one may regard
acquiescence as a form of acceptance, albeit a weak one. Thus, despite the fact that the ordinary citizen needs to hire a lawyer when
the chips are down, it seems to me perfectly proper to speak of him
or her as accepting the fundamental rule of recognition. What follows from that? For Hart, societies with any kind of a legal system
at all are identifiable and definable in terms of that rule of recognition. To be a member of a given society is to accept a given rule of
recognition. The rule of recognition is in that way cohesive of and
constitutive of a society. The deep significance of this for Hart is
that ultimately the reason for such association is, as he calls it,
natural necessity. 8 Inevitably, men will bind themselves together
in societies and accept fundamental rules of recognition. This is
internal to what it is to be a social being.
96. Id. at 114.
97. See, e.g., id. at 198.
98. Id. at 195.
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As Winch has remarked in rejecting the Hobbesian conception of
man and society, if obedience to the law is motivated only by prudence, then the existence of authority is merely an external fact of
one's environment.9 Yet the doctrine of natural necessity for a
minimum content of natural law says that it is not external to oneself as a social being but internal. Hobbes thinks that men existing
in the state of nature are quite conceivable as men. Indeed, any
contractarian theory of legal obligation so posits: that is part of the
point of the metaphor of a contract.
Macpherson's proper emphasis on the fact that Hobbes constructs the state of nature out of present society does not affect the
issue. 100 By contrast, if Hart is right, the metaphor of 'natural necessity' implies that such a thing is not conceivable. As Winch suggestively puts it, the relation between citizen and sovereign must
be understood in terms of a certain quality of life. 10 1 The voluntariness that thus is needed to create legitimate authority for the law
is not the occurrent voluntariness of the signing of a covenant, but
the long-term dispositional voluntariness internal to the existence
of a complex social practice of acceptance of a rule of recognition.
Payne is quite right that, if we take Hart literally when he says
that ordinary citizens need only obey, the law exercises power
rather than authority. This thought of Hart is a blunder which has
no place in a descriptive theory of legal obligation. As Wolin puts
it, turning Hobbes on his head, the stuff of power is not to be
found in a passively acquiescent subject. 0 2 Political reality is that
power which is best exercised when its authority is actively accepted; it becomes in that way no longer in the philosopher's sense
mere power.
Hart's theory of laws as social rules is not, as Payne claims, the
source of difficulty in erecting a satisfactory account of the authority and obligatoriness of the law. Or at least it is not when it is
handled correctly. We do need to delineate carefully what specific
mental attitudes go into acceptance of a rule of recognition. That
task must be left for another time. But, assuming its completion,
99. Winch, Man and Society in Hobbes and Rousseau, in HOBBES AND ROUSSEAU (1971),
ETHICS AND ACTION 102 (1972).
100. C. MACPHERSON, supra note 64, at 21.
101. P. WINCH, supra note 99, at 108.
102. S. WOLIN, supra note 63, at 275.
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Hart's doctrine of the minimum content of natural law claims that
the existence of legitimate legal authority is internal to man as a
social animal. It manifests itself fundamentally in acceptance of a
rule of recognition constitutive of a society, at least in its legal aspect. Hart, as noted, speaks of the existence of this rule of recognition as shown rather than stated.
I do not know whether the Wittgensteinian echo is deliberate,
but it is certainly appropriate. A descriptive theory of legal obligation must be understood not to be giving an account from an external point of view of the obligation to obey the law. Hart suggests
that the existence of the ultimate rule of recognition in a society
can be ascertained by an observer from the external point of
view. 03 This is a mistake. A descriptive theory of legal obligation
must be understood from within something which is fundamental
to any complex society, an essential part of the framework of that
society's form of life. If, as Hart argues, there is a necessary element to any such form of life, then a descriptive theory of legal
obligation is revealing metaphysically deep aspects of, in Wittgenstein's phrase, the natural history of human beings.104 The theory
is not a triviality. Philosophy, Wittgenstein says, leaves everything
as it is. 11 5 A descriptive theory of legal obligation leaves legal obligation as it is. But one which employs the proper elements, and
properly deploys them, as Hart's theory goes a good way towards
doing, shows how legal obligation is in its own right a necessary
part of human life as we know it. Legal obligation does not have to
be reduced to prudence and self-interest or to moral obligation in
order to have its authority justified. It is there, part of our form of
life, because 6it is rooted in natural necessity. It has to be accepted
0
as a given.

103. H. HART, supra note 3, at 99.
104. L. WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS
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106. Id. at 226.
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